Mayank Kumar

We establish a causal link between carbon emissions and shareholder value using the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which imposed cap-and-trade regulation on electric utilities in Northeastern states. While the regulation successfully reduced CO₂ emissions and decreased short-term profitability, affected utilities experienced higher market-to-book ratios driven by increased expected future cash flows and demand from environmentally-focused institutional investors. Our results demonstrate that short-term profitability concerns may significantly impede carbon transition despite positive long-term value implications.

I examine how preexisting contracts and ownership shape firms' responses to technological change. Using staggered shale gas pipeline expansions, which made gas-fired generation more profitable than coal and oil, and newly assembled plant-level contract data, I show that contracts slow creative destruction. Contracted coal and oil plants are less likely to retire, and contracted gas plants are less likely to add new generators. However, contracts constrain owners differently. Private equity (PE) owners respond more strongly than others, retiring coal and oil generators faster while increasing gas generation. These differences reflect how PE owners manage existing sales contracts and supplier relationships.

This paper shows that fossil fuel assets offer valuable opportunities for renewable development, and private equity firms are better positioned to identify and realize these opportunities. Using variation in solar investment potential and tax credit timing, I find PE firms are more likely to acquire fossil plants with greater solar development opportunities. PE acquisition leads to increased local solar development—a 3-percentage-point higher likelihood of new projects and 8% more solar capacity within five miles. These effects operate through operational improvements (battery storage investments) and PE relationships with institutional investors who finance solar projects. The findings suggest that regulations prohibiting PE investment in fossil fuels may unintentionally reduce clean energy investment.

This paper studies how creditor rights affect small business bankruptcy outcomes. Exploiting the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 as an exogenous shock to creditor rights, I show that reducing creditor power increases Chapter 11 filings, but successful reorganization only increases for firms with secured debt and multiple creditors. The findings suggest that secured creditors exhibit liquidation bias and excess market power, while multiple-creditor contexts create coordination failures that impede contract renegotiation outside of bankruptcy.